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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article challenges the Law Court's expansive interpretation in
State v. Caouette' of the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination
embodied in Article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution in the context
of reviewing claims of the involuntariness of a confession. The court's
declaration that a reliable confession must be suppressed on state
constitutional grounds based solely on a suspect's internal factors, and
in the absence of any police overreaching in obtaining the confession,
contradicted two centuries of constitutional jurisprudence requiring
some form of government action to implicate the protections of the Bill
of Rights and the Declaration of Rights. In its 1986 decision in
Colorado v. Connelly,2 the United States Supreme Court implicity
rejected the Law Court's approach. In view of the Law Court's recent
reaffirmation in State v. Eastman3 of the coextensive nature of the
federal and state privileges against self-incrimination, it is questionable
whether, after Connelly, the principle enunciated in Caouette is still
viable.
Part II of this Article provides a brief introduction to the application
of the privilege. Part III discusses the origins and history of the privilege
against self-incrimination and its subsequent embodiment in the federal
and state constitutions. An explanation of how the privilege has been
applied to confessions in federal and state courts is provided in Part IV.
Parts V and VI review the holdings of Caouette and Connelly. This
Article concludes that the Law Court erred in abandoning the threshold
requirement of police overreaching when assessing the constitutionality
of a confession. This is particularly true in view of the United States
Supreme Court's subsequent diametrically-opposed treatment of the
same question and the Law Court's own longstanding line of cases,
stating that the scope of the state privilege against self-incrimination is
the same as the scope of the federal privilege.
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Maine Department of the Attorney
General; B.A., 1985, University of Southern Maine; M.A., 1989, University of Southern Maine;
J.D., 1989, University of Maine School of Law. The Author would like to thank the following
individuals who reviewed drafts of this Article: the Honorable John C. Sheldon, Professors David
D. Gregory and Melvyn H. Zarr, and Assistant Attorneys General William Baghdoyan, James
Cameron, Thomas Goodwin, Charles Leadbetter, and Kerry O'Brien.
1. 446A.2d 1120 (Me. 1982).
2. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
3. 1997ME39, 691A.2d 179.
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II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
In 1982, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
declared in Caouette that coercive police conduct is not a necessary
predicate to finding a confession involuntary.4 The Law Court stated
that trial courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including
internally coercive factors such as the defendant's mental state, to
determine whether a statement "is the result of [a] defendant's exercise
of his own free will and rational intellect."' The court grounded its
decision in the privilege against self-incrimination contained within
Article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution.6 The Caouelte court also
stated that its holding was "consistent with, if not required by, the classic
definitions of voluntariness set forth in United States Supreme Court
decisions." Since Caouette, the Law Court has considered both external
and internal factors in determining whether a statement must be
suppressed as involuntary!
Four years after Caouette was decided, however, the United States
Supreme Court, in determining the scope of the federal constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, categorically rejected the Law
Court's approach. In Colorado v. Connelly,9 the Supreme Court, in a
majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that
"coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" The majority further held that
the Fifth Amendment, likewise, was concerned solely with governmental
coercion: "The voluntariness of a waiver of [the] privilege [against self-
4. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123.
5. Id
6. See id at 1122. This notion was foreshadowed by the Law Court's earlier decision in
State v. Collins, 297 Ai2d 620,626-27 (Me. 1972) (requiring that the State establish voluntariness
of confessions beyond a reasonable doubt to better protect the values inherent in the Maine privilege
against self-incrimination).
7. State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123.
8. See, e.g., Statev. Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1310-11 (ie. 1996) (intoxication, limited
education); State v. Cumming, 634 A.2d 953, 955-56 (Me. 1993) (mental state, no external
coercion); Statev. Smith, 615 A2d 1162,1163-64 (Me. 1992) (mental condition, crying); State v.
Cyr, 611 A.2d 64,66 (Me. 1992) (emotional state, food and sleep deprivation); State v. Barczak,
562 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1989) (intoxication); State v. Snow, 513 A.2d 274, 276 (Me. 1986)
(alcohol, amnesia); State v. Knights, 482 A.2d 436,440-41 (Me. 1984) (mental deficiency); State
v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497,501 (Me. 1983) (intoxication, nakedness); State v. White. 460 A.2d
1017, 1021 (Me. 1983) (crying); State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404,413-14 (Me. 1982) (side effects
of medication, emotional condition).
9. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
10. Id at 167. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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incrimination] has always depended on the absence of police
overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word.""
For over a decade in Maine, there has been a substantial inconsistency
between federal and state law: The extent of a criminal suspect's
privilege against self-incrimination depends entirely upon whether he or
she is being prosecuted for a federal or a state crime. In a federal case,
as long as the police have followed the rules in interrogating the suspect,
any statement the suspect may have made will be admissible at trial. In
a state case, however, proper police behavior does not end the inquiry.
A suspect's confession may be declared involuntary, and thus
inadmissible for trial purposes, even if the police employ the most
exemplary standards in interrogating the suspect. Internal physical and
psychological factors unique to the suspect may be sufficient to cause a
suspect's confession to be suppressed.
In 1997, the Law Court may have provided the means to rectify this
inconsistency. In Eastman, the Law Court repeated, for the first time
since Connelly had been decided by the United States Supreme Court,
what it had indicated in many decisions before Connelly:2 The privilege
against self-incrimination contained in the Maine Constitution is
coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 The court noted,
however, that the procedures developed to protect a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination in state courts differed somewhat
from those used in federal court. For instance, in Maine, the State has
the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a defendant's statement
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt as compared to the lower standard
of a preponderance of the evidence employed in the federal courts. 4
Nevertheless, in substance, the court noted what it had always
recognized-that the federal and state constitutional privileges against
self-incrimination have the same scope of protection.
III. HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The privilege developed in England during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries as a result of opposition to the employment of the
ex officio oath by the Court of the Star Chamber and the Court of the
11. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. See, e.g., Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen, 481 A.2d 499 (Me. 1984); State v.
Nason, 433 A.2d 424 (Me. 1981); State v. Hanson, 342 A.2d 300 (Me. 1975); State v. Vickers, 309
A.2d 324 (Me. 1973); Collett v. Bither, 262 A.2d 353 (Me. 1970); Opinion of the Justices, 255
A.2d 643 (Me. 1969); State v. Castonguay, 240 A.2d 747 (Me. 1968); Brunswick Constr. Co. v.
Leonard, 149 Me. 426, 103 A.2d 115 (1954); Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 82 A.2d 773
(1951); State v. Gilman, 51 Me. 206 (1862).
13. See State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39, 12,691 A.2d 179, 183.
14. See id. at n.4; see also Lgo v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (establishing federal
standard of proof); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972) (establishing state standard of proof).
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High Commission in Causes Ecclesiastical. 5 Because of the ex officio
oath, judges of the ecclesiastical courts were authorized to call persons
before the court and actively interrogate them about all aspects of their
personal affairs. 6 Torture was often used as a device to extract the
"truth" from persons before these courts.'
7
Indeed, prior to 1645, mandatory self-incrimination was the order of
the day even in the common law courts of England."8 The accused was
usually interrogated by magistrates prior to trial, with the results of the
examination admissible at trial. 9 The accused was also required to
submit to vigorous interrogation during trial, upon pains of extreme
forms of torture for failure to do so.2 °
Opposition to the coercive tactics used by the Court of the Star
Chamber and the High Commission culminated with the trial of John
Lilburn, a vocal opponent of the reigning Stuart Monarchy, in 1637."
Lilburn was charged in the Court of the Star Chamber with printing or
importing heretical and seditious books." He refused to submit to the
ex officio oath and as a result was whipped and pilloried.' Lilburn
applied to Parliament for relief, which was ultimately granted.2? 4 In 1641,
Parliament abolished the Court of the Star Chamber and the High
Commission and prohibited the use of the ex officio oath to require an
answer to "things penal." At this time, the common law courts also
reformed their procedure with respect to self-incrimination during the
trial.26 Pretrial examination by magistrates continued unabated,
however, until the middle of the nineteenth century.27
The newly emerged privilege against self-incrimination made its way
across the Atlantic to the New England colonies at about the same
time.2" The Puritans were opposed to the New England magistrates'
compulsion of self-incriminatory statements because they believed the
magistrates were trying to force compliance with an established
church.29 By 1650, the privilege was fairly well-established in New
15. See CHARLES TILFORD MCCOIRICK, MCCOJAICK ON EVIDEN E § 114, at 279-80
(Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 1984).
16. See idJ
17. See itat280.
18. Seeid. at280-81.
19. See id at280.
20. See id
21. See id The trial is reported at 3 COBBEIT'S STATETRIALS 1315 (1637).
22. See MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 280.
23. See id. at 280-81.
24. See id at281.
25. See id (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORF, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2250. at 282-84
(McNaughton rev. 1961)).
26. See idl
27. See id
28. See id at 282 (citing R. Carter Pittman, Comment, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L REV. 763, 775 (1935)).
29. See id
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England.3" A century later, the privilege was incorporated into several
state constitutions, including that of Massachusetts, in 1780.
31
The privilege was also included in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which became effective in 1791. The driving force
behind inclusion of the privilege in the Bill of Rights appended to the
new federal Constitution was "[t]he Colonies['] ... own experiences
with highhanded prerogative courts. 32 In 1820, when Maine separated
from Massachusetts and was admitted into the Union as a state, the
drafters of the Maine Constitution included the privilege in Article I, the
Declaration of Rights, virtually without debate.3
IV. THE PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
A. Federal Courts
The notion that a person's confession was inadmissible in court if it
was obtained involuntarily, such as by threats or promises of
inducement, was a generally accepted principle of the common law by
the late eighteenth century when the Bill of Rights was drafted.34 The
rule was provoked by general concern for the reliability of evidence,
rather than the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. 35
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's first confession case, Hopt
v. Utah,36 was not decided on the basis of the privilege, but on the basis
of federal evidence law. In Hopt, the Court adopted the rule requiring
exclusion of confessions:
when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence
of inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority,
touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or
in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or
hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that
freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession
voluntary within the meaning of the law."
30. See id.
3 1. See id at 282 n.6. Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "no subject shall be... compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." MAss.
CONsT. arL XII, § 1.
32. 8 WiGMOR, supra note 25, § 2250, at294; see also McCoRMCsupra note 15, § 114,
at 279-80.
33. See Debates and Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Maine (1819-
1820) 117-18 (1894).
34. See MCCoRMIci, supra note 15, § 146, at 372.
35. See, e.g., The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234,234-35, 1 Leach Cr. C. 263,263-
64 (K.B. 1783). See generally 3 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 822
(Chadbourn rev. 1970) (stating that the common-law principle upon which a confession may be
excluded is testimonial untrustworthiness).
36. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
37. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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It was not until thirteen years later, in Bran v. United States,3 that the
Court applied the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in a confession case. The Court stated that the federal constitutional
privilege embodied the common law rule of voluntariness, which
required either a threat or promise by someone in authority over the
confessor. 9
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was not incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment until 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan," state
criminal convictions relying in whole or in part on coerced confessions
were not immune from federal constitutional scrutiny. Beginning with
the seminal case of Brown v. Mississippi" in 1936, the United States
Supreme Court reviewed such cases utilizing a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process analysis. In Brown, the Court vacated murder
convictions resting in large part on confessions obtained through the
whipping of the three defendants by the police: "It would be difficult to
conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those
taken to procure confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was
a clear denial of due process.
Even after Malloy incorporated the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court continued to employ the substantive
due process approach in assessing involuntariness claims.43 In Davis v.
North Carolina,4 the Court noted that the Brown due process standard
was "the same general standard which [is] applied in federal
prosecutions-a standard grounded in the policies of the privilege
against self-incrimination. '
By 1966, the Supreme Court had apparently concluded that its prior
line of voluntariness cases had proven inadequate to provide police
officers with clear guidelines governing what conduct was appropriate
or inappropriate during pretrial interrogations of criminal suspects."
That year, the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,47 concluding for the
first time that custodial interrogation by police officers implicated the
38. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
39. See id at 548.
40. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
41. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
42. Id at 286. There are other Supreme Court involuntary confession cases in which the
Court has employed a substantive due process analysis. See generally Torsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
43. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,401-02 (1978) (holding that any use against
a criminal defendant of his involuntary statement constitutes a denial of due process).
44. 384 U.S. 737(1966).
45. Id. at 740.
46. See MCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 150, at 384.
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1998]
MAINE LAWREVIEW
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.48 Prior to
Miranda, the traditional view had been that the privilege was only
implicated in those situations in which the inquiring person had the legal
right to compel answers.49 In speaking to this issue, the Court stated:
"As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of
the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations."5 For over thirty years, fleshing out the requirements of
Miranda has dominated federal confessions jurisprudence.5 As a result,
the traditional test of "voluntariness" of a confession has assumed
secondary significance except when the strictures of Miranda do not
apply to the situation.52
B. State Courts
The earliest reported case applying the Maine constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination was State v. Gilman53 in 1862. In Gilman, the
Law Court allowed admission of evidence of the defendant's sworn
testimony, given at a pretrial coroner's inquest, in the defendant's
subsequent criminal trial. The court stated:
The true test of admissibility in this class of cases is, was the
statement offered in evidence made voluntarily, without compulsion?
If this proposition be answered in the affimnative, then the statement
is clearly admissible in principle; but if not voluntary, if obtained by
any degree of coercion, then it must be rejected....
Interestingly, the defendant also raised a federal Fifth Amendment
challenge to the testimony in addition to his state constitutional claim.55
The Law Court treated the state claim in the same manner as the federal
claim 56 -thus beginning its long tradition of treating the federal and state
privileges against self-incrimination as having the same scope of
protection.
The coextensive nature of the federal and state privileges against self-
incrimination was made explicit by the Law Court in 1951 in Gendron
v. Burnham:57  "These two constitutional provisions [the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6 of
the Maine Constitution] are so similar in nature and identical in purpose
that precedent with respect to the construction of the one may well serve
48. See McCoRIcK, supra note 15, § 150, at 385.
49. See id.
50. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461.
51. See McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 150, at 385.
52. See id § 147, at 376. Miranda does not apply to a situation unless both "custody" and
"interrogation" are present. See id
53. 51 Me. 206 (1862).
54. Id at 223.
55. See id. at 215-16.
56. See id.
57. 146 Me. 387,82 A.2d 773 (1951).
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as precedent for the construction of the other.""8  In the decades
following Gendron, the Law Court continued to treat the state privilege
against self-incrimination as having the same substantive scope as the
federal privilege against self-incrimination.59
The Maine privilege against self-incrimination was rarely, if ever,
utilized to suppress involuntary confessions, probably because of the
general understanding that the privilege did not apply to pretrial police
interrogation. Rather, the early rationale for excluding such confessions
was based on the common law's concern for evidentiary reliability.'
The Law Court's early confession cases also adopted the common
law's requirement that external coercion exist in order to render a
person's confession involuntary. In State v. Grover,6' the defendant,
who had been arrested for arson, attempted to exclude inculpatory
statements he made following his arrest to the chairperson of the board
of selectmen and to an insurance commissioner.62 The presiding justice
refused to suppress the statements because they were not made as a
result of coercion by the arresting constable.63 The Law Court stated:
[A confession] is voluntary, though made in answer to questions or
even solicitations, if it be made from the free, unrestrained will of the
respondent. Again, the constraint to make a confession im'oluntary
must come from without, be imposed by some other person
apparently vestedwith power to punish or reward Hence ifwithout
such outside interference the respondent himself reasons that he better
confess simply in order to avoid some temporal evil impending over
him or to obtain some temporal personal good, his confession is still
voluntary, being from his unconstrained will."
In the 1965 case of Michaudv. State,6" the Law Court, in considering
an involuntary confession claim in a post-conviction review matter,
applied the Brown federal substantive due process analysis.' The court,
in the context of specifically determining whether an incriminatory
admission should be treated in the same fashion as a confession, quoted
58. M, at 395, 82 A.2d at 780.
59. See cases cited supra note 12.
60. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171, 174 (1842) (quoting The King v. Warickshall, 68
Eng. Rep. 234,234-35, Leach Cr. C. 263-64 (K.B. 1783)); see also State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620,
634 n.13 (1972). Evidentiary reliability was abandoned as a primary concern in involuntary
confession cases by the United States Supreme Court in Rogers v. RPchmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41
(1961).
61. 96 Me. 363,52A. 757 (1902).
62. See id at367,52A. at759.
63. Seeid at368,52A.at759.
64. Id at 365,52 A. at 758 (emphasis added); see also Stale v. Priest, 117 Me. 223,228,
103 A. 359,363 (1918); 1 SIMoN GREENLFAF, ATREATisE ON THE LAW OFEVEN E § 219, cm 354
(16th ed. 1899) ("The material inquiry, therefore, is, whether the confession has been obtained by
the influence of hope or fear, applied by a third person to the prisoner's mind.").
65. 161 Me. 517,215 A.2d 87 (1965).
66. See id at531,215 A.2d at94.
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this passage from Justice Traynor's decision in People v. Atchley:67
"Involuntary confessions are excluded because they are untrustworthy,
because it offends 'the community's sense of fair play and decency' to
convict a defendant by evidence extorted from him, and because
exclusion serves to discourage the use of physical brutality and other
undue pressures in questioning those suspected of crime."68 The Law
Court spoke to the rationale underlying the voluntariness test: "[W]ith
respect to voluntariness the test is always whether or not there has been
under all the circumstances a violation of 'fundamental fairness' or what
we ourselves have sometimes termed 'governmental fair play."'69 This
is a substantive due process analysis that requires some form of
governmental action to trigger it. In its decision, the Law Court made no
mention of the federal or state privileges against self-incrimination.
In 1972, the Law Court upset the apple cart. In State v. Collins," the
Law Court discussed the interrelationship of the federal and state
privileges against self-incrimination in the context of an involuntariness
claim. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Lego
v. Twomey,7" had recently formulated, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, the principle that the prosecution had the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's
confession was voluntary.72 The Law Court pointed out that Lego
merely established a minimum standard, citing the Supreme Court's
observation that "'the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt
a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate
resolution of the values they find at stake.'" The Law Court accepted
the Supreme Court's invitation to adopt a higher standard under Maine
law:
Hence, the presiding Justice, although he is "carefully trained in the
law and fortified by judicial experience"--as an extra precaution to
ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination is being plenarily
67. 346 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1959).
68. Id. at 769, quoted in State v. Michaud, 215 A.2d at 93.
69. Statev. Michaud, 161 Me. at 531, 215 A.2dat 94. Similarly, in State v. Smith, 277 A.2d
481 (Me. 1971), the Law Court applied a substantive due process analysis in reviewing the
voluntariness of a confession. The court implicitly stated that the ultimate question to be answered
was whether the police action towards the suspect was fundamentally fair:
With respect to the voluntariness of confessions the test is whether or not in any given
case there has been under the totality of the circumstances fundamental fairness and
governmental fair play on the part of the police dispelling any coercive effect from the
sum total of the operating factors involved.
The test of the admissibility of confessions is whether they were extorted from the
accused by some threat or elicited by some promise (such would be involuntary and
inadmissible), or were made from a willingness on the part of the accused to tell the
truth and relieve his conscience (such would be regarded as voluntary and admissible).
Id at 490 (citations omitted).
70. 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972).
71. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
72. See State v. Collins, 297 A.2d at 625 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)).
73. Id. at 626 (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489).
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implemented,-must apply the strict standard that the prosecution
establish the legal admissibility of a confession by "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." 4
The court readily admitted that its prior case lav involving the
admissibility of confessions under the Maine Constitution did not
specifically address the standard of proof necessary to establish that the
statements were made voluntarily. 5 The court could have adopted the
Lego preponderance standard based on a century of its cases establishing
that the federal and state privileges against self-incrimination are
coextensive, but the Law Court failed even to mention those cases.
The court claimed that a higher standard was necessary in Maine
courts because the federal preponderance standard of proof, adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Lego, merely reflected the value of
deterring lawless conduct by the police and prosecution. 6 Our state's
public policy, proclaimed the court, goes beyond deterring official
overreaching to emphasize the right of the individual, embodied in the
privilege against self-incrimination, not to be compelled to condemn
himself by his own utterances." The court stated that the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination incorporated its own inherent
exclusionary rule predicated upon "voluntariness," which the court
defined to mean that the government could not use a person's confession
unless that person chose "freely and knowingly, to provide criminal self-
condemnation by utterances from his own lips." ' In a related footnote,
the court explained that this concept even encompasses situations in
which the police conduct is exemplary but "other reasons" render the
person's statement not "the product of his free will and rational
intellect."79
Despite this discussion about the privilege against self-incrimination
incorporating the "voluntariness" doctrine, the court in several instances
made reference to "due process" voluntariness, which, as discussed
above, requires governmental action." Indeed, the court recognized in
a footnote that the primary values reflected in the constitutional
requirement that involuntary confessions be excluded from evidence are
(1) safeguarding an individual's right not to be compelled to condemn
himself by his own utterances and (2) deterring lawless conduct by the
74. Id at 627.
75. See id at 625.
76. See id at 626.
77. See id
78. Id
79. Id at 626 n.5. This appears to be the Law Court's first reference to the 'fre will and
rational intellect" language first used by the United States Supreme Court in Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). The Supreme Court's Blackburn decision mas grounded in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, and not in the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. See id at 200, 211.
80. See State v. Collins, 297 A.2d at 624,627, 631 n. 1, 634 n.13.
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police and the prosecution." Both of these values either explicitly or
implicitly require some form of compulsion.
Because the court found that the hearing justice properly concluded
that the defendant's confession was voluntarily made beyond a reason-
able doubt after a consideration of the totality of the circumstances,
including both internally and externally coercive factors, its language
about the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination was dictum.
Nevertheless, the way had been cleared for the court's subsequent
decision in Caouette.
V. STATE V CAOUETTE
On April 14, 1981, Robert Caouette was indicted and subsequently
arrested for murder. 2 He was taken to the Androscoggin County Jail
that same afternoon, and at approximately 8:30 p.m., Caouette became
physically ill and was transferred to the medical room at the jail. 3 He
told the deputy sheriff in charge that he had been vomiting since the
supper hour." Caouette was permitted to telephone his wife, and after
the call he began to cry. 5 He asked the deputy sheriff to stay in the
medical room and talk with him. 6 The deputy sheriff "repeatedly told
[Caouette] that he did not want to discuss his case because he was not
the investigating officer" and "that anything [Caouette] said could be
used against him."" Despite these warnings, Caouette made inculpatory
statements.88 After each admission, the deputy repeated the warnings.89
The deputy asked no questions and returned Caouette to his cell in an
effort to stop him from talking.
Caouette filed a motion to suppress the inculpatory statements he
made to the deputy sheriff at the jail.9"' Caouette's motion asserted that
his jailhouse statements were involuntary and that their use at trial would
constitute violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.' Caouette testified at the hearing on the
81. See id at 634 n.13 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,485,489 (1972)).
82. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Me. 1982). A person commits the crime
of"intentional or knowing" murder if that person "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another human being." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201(1)(A) (West 1983).
83. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1121.
84. See id
85. See id
86. See id
87. Id.
88. See id
89. See id
90. See id
91. See id
92. See id Interestingly, it does not appear that Caouette explicitly raised the corresponding
provisions in the Maine Constitution in his motion. Nevertheless, on appeal, the Law Court
construed the voluntariness claim as if the state privilege against self-incrimination had also been
raised as an issue. See id at 1122.
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motion that "he had not intended to discuss the case with anyone."' He
claimed that he did not remember the events following his arrest,
including the statements he made to the deputy sheriff, "because he was
sick, frightened, and unfamiliar with his surroundings."
The hearing justice granted Caouette's motion and suppressed his
inculpatoryjailhouse admissions even though the deputy sheriff had not
asked Caouette any questions and had warned him repeatedly that his
statements could be used against him.95 The hearing justice ruled that
under the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's illness,
emotional state, and lack of familiarity with his surroundings, the State
had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Caouette's
admissions were voluntary. 6 Yet, the trial court "did not find that the
statements were compelled or elicited by police conduct." The State
appealed the trial court's ruling to the Law Court.'
The Law Court affirmed the trial court's decision in a unanimous
opinion authored by current Chief Justice Daniel E. Wathen." The court
rejected the State's argument that improper police conduct is required
before a suspect's statement can be suppressed as involuntary.0
Picking up where the Collins court left off ten years earlier, Justice
Wathen explained that the same federal-state relationship exists when
dealing with the substance of the privilege against self-incrimination, as
well as with the procedure used to uphold it: "It must be remembered
that the privilege exists in this case by virtue of the Maine Constitution.
... The maximum statement of the substantive content of the privilege
and the requirements of voluntariness must be decided by this Court-as
a matter of Maine law."''
The Caouette court asserted that none of its prior cases, before or
after Collins, had presented the issue raised in the State's appeal,
specifically, whether a statement can be excluded as involuntary if there
is no improper police behavior. Justice Wathen mentioned that there
were dicta in several of the Law Court's prior cases, including Collins,
93. Id. at 1121.
94. Id
95. See ld
96. See id
97. Id
98. See id at 1120-21. Pursuant to section 2115-A(1) of title 15 of the Maine Revised
Statutes and Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 37B, the State has the right to pursue an appeal to
the Law Court, upon the approval of the Attorney General, of any adverse pretrial order that "has
a reasonable likelihood of causing serious impairment to or termination of the prosecution." ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2115-A(1) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
99. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1121-22.
100. See id at 1121.
101. d at 1122.
102. See id The court was wrong in this regard. The issue had been squarely presented in
the court's prior decision in State v. Grover, 96 Me. 363. 52 A. 757 (1902), and the court had
required that there be some form of external coercion before a statement could be suppressed as
involuntary. See id at 365, 52 A. at 758.
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that would suggest that internal coercion, by itself, could be sufficient
to render a defendant's confession involuntary."°3 Justice Wathen also
cited one federal case and two Pennsylvania cases explicitly holding that
internal coercion was enough.1e4 "Such a result would appear to be
consistent with, if not required by," Justice Wathen noted, "the classic
definitions of voluntariness set forth in United States Supreme Court
decisions."' 05
After surveying the existing state and federal decisional landscape on
this issue, Justice Wathen stated the court's holding in Caouette as
follows:
[W]e now hold that in order to find a statement voluntary, it must first
be established that it is the result of defendant's exercise of his own
free will and rational intellect. While a claim of compulsion will
frequently be predicated upon police elicitation or conduct, that
element is not a sine qua non for exclusion under the exclusionary
rule inherent in the guarantee against self-incrimination. While proof
that a defendant's statement is spontaneous and unsolicited will often
result in a finding of voluntariness, such proof does not compel a
finding that the defendant was free from "compulsion of whatever
nature.
,,I o6
By 1982, Collins had established such a firm foundation for applying the
state privilege against self-incrimination more stringently than the
federal privilege, Caouette created less of a tremor in the legal
community than it otherwise would have. 7 Nevertheless, Caouette was
103. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123. The other Law Court cases mentioned were
State v. Ashe, 425 A.2d 191 (Me. 1981), State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me. 1981), and State v.
Gordon, 387 A.2d 611 (Me. 1978).
104. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123 (citing Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Ritter, 340 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v. Alston, 317 A.2d
241 (Pa. 1974)).
105. State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123. Justice Wathen proceeded to quote Justice Felix
Frankfurter's majority decision in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961):
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-
American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has
willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne
and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession
offends due process. The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is
lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel
the confession.
State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123 (citation omitted) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
at 602 (1961)). The Law Court failed to discuss the fact that the rationale for Culombe was
substantive due process concerns, stemming from police coercion. See Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. at 606-21.
106. State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123-24 (footnote omitted).
107. For an excellent critique of the Caouette decision, see John C. Sheldon, The
Obsolescence of Voluntary Confessions in Maine, 35 ME. L. REV. 243 (1983). Perhaps another
explanation for the Law Court's willingness to go beyond the minimum level of protection of
individual rights required by the federal Constitution can be found in the desire of many in the legal
community in the early 1980s to apply state constitutional law principles to address the Burger
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groundbreaking because it was the first time that the Law Court had held
that the substance of the state privilege against self-incrimination was
more protective of criminal suspects than the federal privilege was; 8
Collins had dealt only with procedure.
VI. COLORADO V. CONNELLY
In August 1983, an off-duty, uniformed Denver police officer was
approached by Francis Connelly."0 9 Without any prompting from the
officer, Connelly said "that he had murdered someone and wanted to talk
about it.""' The officer immediately advised Connelly of his Miranda
rights, but Connelly, after stating that he understood his rights, said he
"wanted to talk about the murder.""' In response to questions from the
officer, Connelly stated that he had not been drinking, nor was he under
the influence of drugs at that time."' Connelly also stated that he had
been a patient at several mental hospitals in the past."' The officer
"again told Connelly that he was under no obligation to say anything,"
but "Connelly replied that it was 'all right' and that he would talk to [the
officer] because his conscience had been bothering him.""' 4 "Shortly
thereafter," a homicide detective arrived at the scene, re-advised
Connelly of his rights, and "asked him 'what he had on his mind.""' 5
Connelly said "that he had come all the way from Boston to confess" to
killing a young girl in Denver nine months earlier."6 Connelly was
taken to the police station, where a search of records confirmed that an
unidentified female's body had been found four months earlier."7 The
officers asked Connelly to take them to the scene of the killing and he
readily agreed to do so."' With no prompting from the officers,
Connelly led the police to "the exact location of the murder."".9 At no
time during any of the questioning by the police, or when Connelly was
leading the police to the scene of the crime, did any of the officers
Court's perceived reduction in individual rights under the federal Constitution, especially the rights
of criminal defendants. See, e.g., Justice Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L REv. 379 (1980); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also State v. Cadman, 476
A2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984) (requiring that state constitutional claims be analyzed before fcderal
constitutional claims).
108. See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1123.
109. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160 (1986).
110. Id
111. Id.
112. See id
113. Seeid
114. Id
115. Id
116. Id
117. Seeid
118. See id
119. Id at 160-61.
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observe that Connelly was suffering from the effects of mental illness. 2 '
Connelly was held in custody overnight.
21
The following morning, Connelly became visibly disoriented and told
his public defender that voices had told him to come to Denver and
confess.'" Connelly was sent to a state hospital for an evaluation, where
he was determined to be incompetent to stand trial until the spring of
1984.'" Connelly moved to suppress all of his statements, claiming that
they were involuntary because they were compelled by his mental
illness. 124 A defense psychiatric expert testified that Connelly was a
chronic schizophrenic who was in a psychotic state when he approached
the off-duty officer in Denver and made his confession. 125 The expert
testified that Connelly's illness interfered with his ability to make free
and rational choices and that his confession was motivated by his
illness. 12
6
Based on the expert's testimony, the trial court suppressed Connelly's
statements, finding that they were involuntary. 2 1 The court, relying on
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Townsend v. Sainm and
Culombe, held that "a confession is admissible only if it is a product of
the defendant's rational intellect and 'free will.""' 129 Even though the
trial court found that there was no coercive police conduct whatsoever
in procuring Connelly's confession, the court nevertheless suppressed
the statements, finding that Connelly's illness compelled him to
confess. 3 ' The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the
proper test for admissibility of a confession is whether the statements
were the "product of a rational intellect and a free will.'' That court
stated that "the absence of police coercion or duress does not foreclose
a finding of involuntariness. One's capacity for rational judgment and
free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental
illness as by external pressure."13 2
The Supreme Court reversed. In a majority opinion by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, the Court rejected the notion that a suspect's mental
condition alone could ever render a suspect's confession involuntary,
under either a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis or a Fifth
120. See id at 161.
121. See id.
122. See id
123. See id
124. See id
125. See id
126. See id at 161-62.
127. See id at 162.
128. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
129. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 162 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Culornbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)).
130. See id
131. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985).
132. Id
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Amendment analysis based on the privilege against self-incrimination.'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court historically had analyzed
involuntary confession claims in state criminal cases under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. l" The Chief Justice
observed that each of the state confession cases involved some crucial
element of police overreaching.' He noted that, "[a]bsent police
conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due
process of law." '36 After rejecting Connelly's assertion that the Court's
prior decisions in Blackburn v. Alabama 37 and Townsend supported the
lower court's conclusion that a defendant's mental condition alone can
render a confession involuntary, the Chief Justice stated that, "while
mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to
police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can
never conclude the due process inquiry."'38
The Court assessed the efficacy of applying the exclusionary rule to
proscribe the use of Cornelly's statements in the absence of any police
misconduct in obtaining the statements: "[S]uppressing respondent's
statements would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional
guarantees. The purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the
Constitution."'39
In summing up the due process analysis, the Court stated:
We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the
finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude
that the taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into
evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause."
Chief Justice Rehnquist also assessed the Miranda and Fifth
Amendment implications of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision.'
133. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165, 169-70.
134. See id at 162.
135. See i at 163.
136. Id at 164.
137. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
138. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
139. Id at 166. The Law Court has expressly recognized that the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. &e Powell v. Secretary of State 614 A.2d 1303,
1306 (Me. 1992) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,347 (1974)).
140. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
141. In section III-A of the decision, the Court rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's
application of the "clear and convincing" standard of proof to the question of the validity of
Connelly's waiver of his Miranda rights. See id at 167-69. The Court rcafTirmed its previous
holding in Lego that the State must establish the voluntariness of a suspect's confession, the core
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, by a preponderance of the evidece.
and consequently found no need to apply a higher standard in deciding whether there has been a
waiver of the auxiliary protections established in Miranda. See Id As discussed earlier, the Law
Court, in Collins, rejected the Lego preponderance standard in determining the voluntariness of
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The Court concluded that the Colorado Supreme Court erred by
importing notions of "free will" into the assessment of the voluntariness
of a Miranda waiver, stating that the analysis of the question in the
Miranda waiver context should be no more taxing than the analysis in
the Fourteenth Amendment due process context.'42 Thus, at least since
Connelly was decided in 1986, it has been clear that neither the Fifth
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires the suppression of
a suspect's statement as involuntary unless coercive police conduct was
present.
If Caouette had been decided on the basis of federal law, either the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Connelly would have had the effect of
superseding Caouette's holding that improper police conduct was not a
necessary predicate to a finding of involuntariness. Caouette and its
progenitor, Collins, however, were both grounded in the privilege
against self-incrimination contained in Article I, section 6 of the Maine
Constitution. Accordingly, the Law Court's holdings in Caouette and
Collins are still binding in Maine courts. The question is whether they
should be reconsidered.
VII. STATE V. EASTMAN: THE SCOPE OF THE MAINE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Even though Collins had gone beyond the requirements of the federal
Constitution with respect to the burden of proof that the State had to
satisfy to demonstrate a confession's voluntary nature, the Law Court
continued to rule that the federal and state privileges against self-
confessions in favor of the more stringent protection of a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-79. With respect to the auxiliary protections afforded by
AW/lranda, however, the Law Court has consistently applied the federal standard of a preponderance
of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1308 (Me. 1996); State v. Hewes, 558
A.2d 696, 700 (Me. 1989). Indeed, the court has also repeatedly stated that Miranda warnings have
never been required as a matter of state constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. McKechnie, 1997 ME
40, 7, 690 A.2d 976, 978 n.1; State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Me. 1986).
142. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-70. The Court specifically addressed the
scope of the Fifth Amendment's protections in this area of the law as follows:
The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is government
coercion. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned "with moral and
psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion."
The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of
police overreaching, not on "free choice" in any broader sense of the word.
Respondent urges this Court to adopt his "free will" rationale, and to find an
attempted waiver invalid whenever the defendant feels compelled to waive his rights by
reason of any compulsion, even if the compulsion does not flow from the police. But
such a treatment of the waiver issue would "cut this Court's holding [in Miranda]
completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale." Miranda protects defendants
against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth
Amendment; it goes no further than that. Respondent's perception of coercion flowing
from the "voice of God," however important or significant such a perception may be in
other disciplines, is a matter to which the United States Constitution does not speak.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170-71 (citations omitted).
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incrimination were coextensive in cases leading up to Caouette."4 3 The
Law Court continued in this fashion in the fifteen years following
Caouette-stating that the federal and state privileges were coextensive
in one case, but applying the more protective CollinslCaouette standard
in addressing claims of involuntariness in other cases.'"
Until last year, the court had not addressed the coextensive nature of
the substantive scope of the federal and state privileges against self-
incrimination since Connelly had been decided. In March of 1997,
however, the Law Court was asked to extend the scope of the state
privilege against self-incrimination even further-and the justices
refused. In Eastman, the court specifically addressed the scope of the
state constitutional privilege: "The federal and state privileges against
self-incrimination serve the same end. As noted by the United States
Supreme Court, 'the constitutional guarantees, however differently
worded, should have as far as possible the same interpretation.' We
have consistently interpreted the Maine privilege co-extensively with the
federal privilege." '145
The court mentioned in a footnote that the procedures used to
effectuate the state privilege against self-incrimination differed from
those used in federal court." The court failed to mention that Caouette
had changed the substantive scope of protections afforded to criminal
defendants raising involuntariness claims under the state privilege
against self-incrimination. Nor did the court discuss why more rigorous
procedures are required in state courts when assessing voluntariness
challenges.
The Eastman footnote raises the question that is the focus of this
Article--is the Law Court signaling a retreat from its previously stated
expansive view of the scope of protections afforded criminal suspects
under the state privilege against self-incrimination? In Eastman, the
143. For post-Collinslpre-Caouette cases addressing the co-extensive nature of the federal and
state privileges against self-incrimination, see, for example, State v. Nason, 433 A.2d 424 (Me.
1981); State v. Hanson, 342 A.2d 300 (Me. 1975); State v. Vickers, 309 A.2d 324 (Me. 1973). For
post-Collinslpre-Caouette cases applying the Collins proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
voluntariness challenges, see, for example, State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me. 1981); State v.
Theriau/t, 425 A.2d 986 (Me. 1981); State v. Ashe, 425 A.2d 191 (Mc. 1981); State v. Carter, 412
A.2d 56 (Me. 1980); State v. Tanguay, 388 A.2d 913 (Me. 1978); State v. Tardtff, 374 Aid 598
(Me. 1977); State v. Wa/Zace, 333 A.2d 72 (Me. 1975); Duguay v. State, 309 Aid 234 (Me. 1973).
144. For the post-Caouette case stating that the federal and state privileges are coextensive,
see Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen, 481 A.2d 499 (Me. 1984). For post-Caouette cases
dealing with claims of involuntariness, see supra note 8.
145. State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39, 11-12, 691 Aid 179, 183 (citing Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,584-85 (1892)).
146. The Court stated:
The procedures developed to protect defendants pursuant to the Maine privilege,
however, differ somewhat from those employed by federal courts. See State v. Snow,
513 A2d 274,276 (Me. 1986) (citing State v. Collins, 297 Aid 620,627 (Me. 1972)
(when an accused claims his statements are involuntary, then the State must establish
voluntariness by proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
State v. Eastman, 1997 ME 39, 12 n.4, 691 Aid at 183 n.4 (emphasis added).
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court saw no principled reason to depart from the federal courts' refusal
to apply the privilege against self-incrimination to non-testimonial
evidence. Since Connelly shut the door to claims of involuntariness in
the federal courts in the absence of coercive police conduct in 1986, the
Law Court has not offered any reason to apply a more expansive
interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Maine
Constitution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A confession is often the most powerful piece of evidence the State
has in its arsenal to establish that a criminal defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.'47 As the United States Supreme Court recognized
in Connelly, "[t]he central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."'4 The Court
also stated that, "[w]hile we have previously held that exclusion of
evidence may be necessary to protect constitutional guarantees, both the
necessity for the collateral inquiry and the exclusion of evidence deflect
a criminal trial from its basic purpose."'
49
Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, and of the Maine
Constitution in 1820, the statement of individual rights delineated in
these governing documents has always been declared to be a limitation
on the power of government to act in a manner that could curtail those
rights.'50 With respect to the privilege against self-incrimination
contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that centuries-old constitutional
principle in Connelly. With respect to the parallel provision in our state
constitution, however, the Law Court abandoned that notion in Caouette.
Eastman provides the Law Court with a fresh opportunity to
reexamine its jurisprudence in this area. If, as the court stated in
Eastman, the Maine privilege against self-incrimination is coextensive
with its federal counterpart in substance, then coercive police conduct
should be a necessary predicate to consideration of a defendant's
constitutional challenge to the admissibility of a confession on
involuntariness grounds, as required under the Fifth Amendment by the
United States Supreme Court in Connelly.
147. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) ("A confession is like no
other evidence.... [A] fil confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means
of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision."); State
v. Harper, 613 A.2d 945, 950 (Me. 1992) (refusing to find constitutionally tainted confession
harmless error despite presence of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, including other
properly obtained admissions).
148. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
149. Id
150. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTnUTONAL LAW § 11-1, at 770 (2d ed.
1988). Indeed, even the Collins court recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination was
a limitation upon government. See State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972).
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There are a myriad of reasons why a defendant's confession may be
unreliable due to internal compulsion. Those considerations should be
dealt with under the Maine Rules of Evidence, however, and not under
the Maine Constitution. It would be preferable to allow the defendant
to explain to the jury why he or she was compelled to confess, but the
confession should not be kept from the jury if the police did nothing
improper in obtaining it. The truth-seeking function of the criminal trial
process can only be enhanced by allowing the fact-finder to consider all
available evidence, as well as any considerations that militate against the
reliability of that evidence, in making its ultimate determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

